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Abstract 
This paper is a reflection upon a central tension within discourse analysis. On the one 
hand, the use of the word discourse signals a desire to understand social interaction as 
it emerges for the people engaged in that interaction, yet on the other hand, the word 
analysis signals that language use will be studied in terms that are external to the 
sense-making of its participants. The discussion focuses in particular on critical 
discourse analysts, motivated by emancipatory goals, for it is for them that the tension 
is most acute. The paper proposes that greater theoretical emphasis be placed by 
critical discourse scholars on the analyst’s interpretative labour. In particular, it argues 
that a more hermeneutic discourse analysis can begin to turn this central problem into 
a strength. 
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Critiquing the Critical: A Reflection on Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
This paper is a reflection upon a central tension within discourse 
analysis. On the one hand, the use of the word discourse signals a desire to 
understand social interaction as it emerges for the people engaged in that 
interaction – either as it makes sense to those people or as it unfolds in their 
everyday lives. On the other hand, the word analysis signals that language use 
is studied in terms that are, to some extent at least, external to the sense-
making of its participants. I am concerned here with the particularly acute 
version of this problem which is faced by critical discourse analysts. Analysts 
who seek to expose unrecognised forces which shape thoughts and actions 
must necessarily impose their own categories upon the language users they 
study. The paper proposes greater theoretical emphasis be placed by critical 
discourse scholars on the analyst’s interpretative labour. In particular, it argues 
that a more hermeneutic discourse analysis can begin to turn this central 
problem into a strength. 
One great appeal of discourse analysis is that it works to reconcile a 
number of dyads. Discourse analysts differ from linguists in that they study 
language as action rather than as a set of rules, yet they look also for 
commonality and for the systemic in that action. Thus the pragmatics scholar 
Thomas (1995) talks of “principles” rather than “rules” of language use. In 
this view, discourse is both an everyday accomplishment of people and a 
structural category by which those everyday accomplishments are organised. 
Discourse analysis is about the emic (the insider’s perspective) as well as the 
etic (the outsider’s), in Pike’s (1967) classic formulation. While the strength of 
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studying language in use is that it keeps both of these poles in view, there is a 
tendency to drift towards one or other pole in much analysis. Ironically, then, 
one great risk of discourse analysis is that analysis which is organised by pre-
existing categories is passed off as grounded in the lived reality of social 
actors. 
This problem is particularly acute in critical forms of discourse 
analysis, for here the aim is to reveal the – often unstated – workings of 
power. Maingueneau (2006) summarises critical discourse research:  
Roughly speaking, discourse analysis would only describe discourse 
practices, whereas critical approaches to texts and talks would show 
how these hide power relations, prejudices, discrimination, and so on 
(p. 229). 
This dichotomy can be easily overstated (as Maingueneau also notes) but 
critical discourse analysis, because it is explicitly bringing external 
perspectives to the language events it is studying, faces particularly sharply 
the accusation that it is misreading or over-reading its object of study in terms 
of the analyst’s own politics. Sociological scholarship influenced by Marx has 
struggled for many years with this “paradox of emancipation” (Benton, 1981): 
radical critics of society struggle on behalf of the interests of oppressed groups 
who often do not recognise the interests ascribed to them. This position is 
theoretically justifiable through the theory of ideology, for part of being 
oppressed might well be to lose sight of one’s own interests; however, in 
practice it is difficult to show that the analyst’s reading embraces the 
oppressed group’s actual interests. 
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One answer to the paradox is that analysts must listen carefully to what 
those they are studying are saying or doing. Benton, for example, argues that 
Marxism should abandon the notion of actual, “objective” interests. Instead its 
analysis of how people are disempowered “must be rooted in at least some 
aspect of the life-experience of those for whose identifications they are in 
competition” (Benton, 1981, p. 182). But critical forms of discourse analysis, 
particularly those which gather themselves together under the banner of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), are, I argue, guilty of not always listening. 
While I would not want to critique the political goals of this school of 
research, I make two specific criticisms. First, this approach, in looking for 
evidence of imbalances of power, is at risk of missing other aspects of the 
context of language use. Second, the approach’s roots in the functional 
linguistics of Halliday (e.g. 1994) exacerbates that neglect of how meaning 
arises in local contexts, and indeed leaves the social or political theory at times 
dissociated from the analysis of language use. As a result, assumptions about 
how society works may not be revised in the analysis. Consequently I propose 
a rethink of how critique relates to understanding in critical discourse analysis. 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
For many researchers of the social, the attraction of studying the 
details of discourse is the set of tools which critical discourse analysts have 
developed over the past 30 years to unpack the role of language and other 
symbolic forms such as images in maintaining social power. These include in 
particular the analysis of the ideological power of vocabulary, syntax, turn-
taking, presupposition, themes, metaphors and narrative structure. For a 
researcher on the news, to take my area as an example, CDA helps to pin 
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down in details of language how prejudice or narrow sectional interests are 
perpetuated in the news. For example, Richardson (2007), in his CDA-
informed textbook on newspaper discourse, shows how various textual forms 
can occlude aspects of meaning by logically presupposing them. Thus “wh-” 
questions, such as “Why do Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Hamas 
want to crush the West and destroy Israel?” (The Guardian, 8 December, 
2001), presuppose a great deal. (Here, they presuppose that these are both 
Islamist terrorist groups, that they do wish to crush both “the West” and Israel 
and that they are broadly similar in aim) (Richardson, 2007, pp. 63-4). While 
there are big question marks over the way language is linked to social life in 
these analyses (on which more below), they clearly provide a formidable 
toolkit for analysts with a critical political agenda.  
Discourse analysis has, it must be said, always had a strong critical 
dimension. Many of those who pioneered the study of language in use sought 
to do so in order to ask questions about the power people have over others 
through talk and text or about the class-based judgements embedded in 
traditional linguistics and stylistics. These include Labov’s (1972) powerful 
case that urban black dialects of English are not ungrammatical, but follow a 
different grammar to the dominant variety, an argument which placed 
linguistics firmly within the political realm. They include Gumperz’s (1982) 
work on how English-speaking cultures’ different conventions of talk can lead 
to intercultural misunderstanding; feminist research on how talking positions 
are distributed unequally between the genders (e.g. Fishman, 1983); and work 
on how social status and ultimately dominance are expressed through ways of 
talking (e.g. Bernstein, 1972). It is clear that the research agenda since the 
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1970s to develop tools for the systematic study of how language works in 
relationships and social life more generally has often been inseparable from a 
critical agenda to explore how inequality, discrimination and injustice are 
perpetuated. 
Critical discourse analysis has emerged as part of that wider project, 
but it has drawn particularly heavily on the Marxist textual analysis of the 
critical linguistics school, which emerged at the University of East Anglia in 
the late 1970s (e.g. Fowler, Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 1979). Its success in using 
linguistic categories of vocabulary and syntax to reveal ideological forces in 
ostensibly objective language led to its wide use in sociology, education and 
media studies. One of the more celebrated early analyses is Trew’s (1979) 
study of British newspaper headlines on political violence in what was then 
Rhodesia. He argued that English grammar’s power to turn active 
constructions into passive ones allowed the headline writer (perhaps 
unconsciously) to omit politically awkward details. In “Eleven Africans Shot 
Dead”, the fact that it was police officers doing the killing could be elided 
away by such passivisation. Through this kind of analysis, critical linguistics 
established early on an argument that the functional elements of language 
described by linguistics could be leveraged to critique the exercise of power. 
While CDA has broadened its approach to draw upon other theories of 
language, particularly those of Foucault (Fairclough, 1995) and latterly Laclau 
and Mouffe (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), the link between textual 
grammatical systems and systems of power has remained a significant 
element.  
Criticism of CDA 
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The approach has been criticised on three main grounds: for its 
political commitment; for its emphasis on critique rather than understanding; 
and for the Hallidayan theory which underpins a number of its analytical tools 
and strategies. I deal only briefly with the first set of arguments, which take 
issue with the political agendas of CDA scholars as non-objective and 
therefore inadequate, for I want to argue that a critical agenda is not only valid 
but imperative to rich understanding of discourse. Widdowson (e.g. 1995) is 
among the leading critics of CDA from this perspective and his chief concern 
is that critical discourse analysts arrive at their analyses with agendas and 
preconceptions which skew their readings. It is certainly useful to point out 
that someone like Trew wrote the analysis above fresh from a South African 
prison, where he had been imprisoned for his work with the banned African 
National Congress. His political anger would certainly have shaped the 
questions he asked, but it is a big jump to argue that his politics would 
necessarily make his findings less valid than those of researchers who read the 
newspaper headline without a well-formed political analysis of apartheid. 
There are two points here. Firstly, the criticism asks only half the question 
about prior commitments. We must also ask about the underlying  agendas and 
preconceptions of the non-radical discourse analyst. Unless one holds tight to 
a positivist concept of knowledge, the observer is clearly part of the analysis. 
Secondly, the criticism (see Schegloff, 1999 for a similar concern) misreads as 
mere opinion the use of a well-developed political theory – here a mix of 
Marxism and post-colonialism – to cast light on language use. The problem of 
critical forms of discourse analysis is not that they are critical. 
 
9 
What is of concern in this paper is the way CDA scholars struggle to 
balance the understanding of discourse with its critique. CDA researchers, like 
many in the tradition of textual analysis, remove texts from their immediate 
contexts in order to read them within political and macro-social contexts. 
While they theorise context, using terms such as genre, register or setting, they 
study the text rather than speakers or listeners. In the second edition of 
Language as Ideology Hodge and Kress (1993) added a chapter in which they 
recognised that texts may have different meanings for different people 
depending on their social and personal background. But the problem is more 
serious than the absence of reception analysis to complement the textual 
analysis: it is the orientation of the critic towards what I would term ideology 
hunting. As a result, the CDA critic is at grave risk of neglecting aspects of 
meaning of a text or the complex ways in which meaning is constructed in 
daily life. Richardson’s example from The Guardian cited above fails to point 
out that the sentence he analyses sits on top of a provocative opinion piece and 
that, therefore, it belongs to a genre which writer and reader alike would 
recognise as not making the same reality claims as news articles. The 
empirical question of the different ideological power of texts from this 
persuasive genre to that of texts from the ostensibly descriptive genre of the 
news is not addressed. It seems that the drive to critique rushes us past such 
questions. 
CDA’s problem, then, is to engage in radical criticism without 
oversimplifying discourse as lived by people, for at the heart of the critical 
approach to the social is the act of stepping outside those people’s frames to 
an extent. This involves raising questions which may not often arise in the 
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speaker’s context, such as whose interests a statement or other verbal act 
serves, or how the dominance of one way of thinking or acting over others is 
reinforced. Similarly, the critical attitude often involves reintroducing the 
interests of others, and asking what of these other interests is being omitted, 
hidden or silenced. Indeed, critical discourse analysis is sometimes construed 
as meaning to deconstruct or de-sanctify knowledge claims and social 
practices that are made in dominant discourses (see Threadgold, 1994). This 
fundamentally means seeking to place some distance between the analyst and 
the object of study, regarding social practices as contingent on their histories 
and contexts and the knowledge they produce as always partial.i The analyst 
must have a foot outside the practice being studied as well as a foot within it, 
in order for these questions of interests to arise and in order to see what is not 
there but which, in the framework of the analyst, could or even should be 
there. That outsider foot has to be situated in another set of social knowledge 
that can make claims to know something about the practice. It is precisely the 
presence, then, of an explicit political commitment that ensures the analysis is 
founded on more than, in Widdowson’s terms, opinion. 
It is, however, always hard to balance one foot inside and one outside 
the practice in this way. CDA in particular is open to the criticism that it has 
gone too far down the outsider orientation. It is, Meyer (2001, p. 16) notes, at 
risk of being “text-reducing” rather than “text-extending”. That is, it pulls out 
certain elements which it regards as important in the ideological functioning of 
the text and neglects other aspects. For example, Jones (2007, p. 363) points 
out that Fairclough’s (2000) CDA analysis of neo-liberal talk about 
globalisation does not engage with the multiple forces shaping that talk. 
 
11 
Fairclough argues that politicians such as then British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair present increasing global economic interdependence as inevitable by 
using an abstract and depersonalised language. It is certainly a valid point that 
such language makes it hard for counter positions to emerge about the power 
of individual countries to pursue alternative versions of global trade. But Jones 
notes that Fairclough has almost nothing to say about the forces and 
discourses constraining Tony Blair. Fairclough closes down analysis by 
making a political point rather than opening up questions about politics in an 
age of globalisation. 
 This same problem arises to an extent when Van Dijk finds racism in 
various forms of discourse. Although Van Dijk’s 20-year-long project on the 
discourse of racism is impressive in its accumulation of evidence, and 
although it is supported by a robust cognitive model of how people process the 
new in terms of what they already know, much of the analysis depends upon 
Van Dijk looking for racist discourse. Theoretically, Van Dijk establishes that 
much of the meaning of discourse lies in the cognitive structures which are 
mobilised in individual speakers’ and hearers’ minds. These scripts and 
models can be theorised but are, by definition, difficult to find in language, 
except as traces and logical precursors (Van Dijk, 1988). All that can be done 
is to find text which is consistent with them and do the considerable 
interpretative work to link them up. In one analysis, Van Dijk (1996) shows 
how an article from The Sun newspaper about illegal immigrants working in 
the UK fails to mention the local businesspeople who are illegally employing 
the immigrants (and indeed exploiting them by paying them low wages). He 
also argues that the article’s sense depends upon a socially shared proposition 
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that “they” are taking “our” jobs – a notion that is nowhere stated but needs to 
be brought by the reader in order to make sense of the information as 
newsworthy. His analysis of how prejudice perpetuates itself through the use 
of a few key words that call up “what everyone knows” is, for me, convincing. 
Yet it points also to the dependence of such critical analysis upon finding gaps 
in the text and then filling them in. For an analyst who expects to see a racist 
society, the implied meanings are clear, and Van Dijk shows the plausibility 
that the text would reinforce racist understandings among those who already 
think like that. But it is difficult to establish from the textual evidence that 
people producing and reading the text do indeed share these meanings. 
Because Van Dijk relies upon his own interpretations of the texts he uses, 
ultimately the only context in which the texts are read is that of the critical 
analyst looking for racism. 
This problem is particularly acute in the significant body of CDA work 
which relies on a functional grammar of language devised by Halliday and 
colleagues, called systemic functional linguistics (SFL) (Halliday, 1994). SFL, 
and therefore critical analysis which uses its categories, is still more distanced 
from the lived discourse of people talking, writing and reading, because it 
ascribes communicative functions to textual elements, allowing analysts to 
read off meaning by grammatically parsing the text. The theory allows 
analysts to identify the set of options available in English to do a certain kind 
of linguistic operation. Critical scholars then interpret the use of one of these 
options as potentially shaped by political forces. The most widely studied 
linguistic operation is transitivity, or the way in which English allows 
processes and participants to be portrayed in clauses. One current version of 
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SFL (Martin & Rose, 2003) finds five options here, and the choice of using 
one of these can be explored as a meaningful choice, perhaps even an 
ideological choice, fitting into preconceptions about who does what in society. 
Cameron (2001) sums up the argument: 
When someone expresses an idea in form X (using these particular 
words and this particular grammatical structure), it is significant that 
they are not expressing the idea in form Y or Z, though Y and Z would 
also have been possibilities. CDA looks for the ideological 
significance of the choices speakers and writers make, and for 
significant patterns in the distribution of their choices. (p. 51) 
Thus an FHM magazine article which textually places men firmly in the 
position of doing things to women, particularly looking at them, and women in 
the position of being talked about or looked at can be argued to be cementing 
in gender discrimination even before the leering and patronising semantic 
level of the text is considered (see Matheson, 2005 for further analysis). 
The reliance on a theory of language that claims to be able to map 
social functions onto the formal or surface aspects of the language – without 
exploring in depth aspects of the particular language event – appears 
problematic to both linguists from other traditions (Harris, 1996) and some 
CDA scholars. Simpson (1993, p. 113) notes that there is a danger of drifting 
into “the untenable hypothesis that a particular linguistic feature, irrespective 
of its context of use, will always generate a particular meaning”. He therefore 
advocates “a modicum of caution” (p.113) in using SFL’s tools in analysing 
texts. Thus, a text where men are performing the action, and women are not, 
may not be sexist, if it is critically describing a sexist situation, for example. 
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But while this grammar provides a useful checklist of language features to 
explore, the caution Simpson recommends in interpreting them only takes us 
so far. The interpretation can still proceed without factoring in the myriad 
other aspects of communication which other discourse analytic approaches 
emphasise: the pragmatic meaning in that particular context, the turn-taking 
rules of that particular exchange, or the wider expectations of that situation. 
Sometimes the analysis works well, although it is limited. To say “chairman” 
rather than “chairperson” is a linguistic choice between largely equivalent 
terms, and the preference reveals – and reinforces – a patriarchal discourse 
grounded in a time when only men could chair most kinds of formal meeting. 
But the analysis is unable to go much further without richer data on context. Is 
this a conscious choice to privilege a male term, or indeed to privilege a term 
that the speaker might argue has lost any gendering assumptions? Does the 
person using “chairman” realistically have other options, or have others 
determined the usage in that context, as is the case with some local authorities 
where “chairman” is the legal term? What power does a gendering term have 
to reposition men and women in this particular social context?ii Much remains 
to be said about how power is operating here. 
More seriously, however, the apparent grammatical choice of using 
this form rather than that form may not be a socially available one much of the 
time. Pragmatics shows us that the same language item can mean very 
different things according to context. Linguistic form does not translate 
straightforwardly into meaning, because what people do with language is 
deeply intertwined with social rules and social action. In addition, corpus 
linguistics has shown quite impressively that linguistic form is also often 
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relatively fixed by convention, despite what grammar allows. Stubbs (2001) 
notes that the verbal form “seeks” is used almost exclusively in lonely hearts 
advertisements, as in, “Professional man gsh seeks blonde 20s”. Many of that 
word’s possible grammatical uses are, it seems, socially unavailable. What 
SFL provides, then, is a list of language items but a fairly weak social theory 
about how the grammatical entity is used to achieve and communicate things 
in social life. 
Instead, the analyst reads the textual evidence in terms of another set of 
theories of politics and social life. Luke (2004) talks of the need to “shunt” the 
text up to that level in order to make an argument about social power: 
To do so entails a series of “shunts”, often in no particular order or 
sequence – from text analysis to social analysis, from the analysis of 
discourse to implications about its consequential conditions of 
production and deployment, from some order of discourse analytic 
metalanguage to social, cultural and political theory, broadly defined 
(p. 150). 
As a consequence of this shift from one theoretical frame to another, the social 
and political theories will not always be tested by the evidence they are 
applied to. Simpson writes: 
 A crude formulation of the problem … would be to say that linguistic  
 analysis is invoked to support what an analyst already knows and that,  
 rather than being able to decipher ideological bias, linguistics is  
 therefore really only a supplement to the prior reading the analyst has  
 made (Simpson, 1993, p. 114).  
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CDA’s project of critique – rather than of understanding – makes it vulnerable 
to such attacks. 
As Benton noted in relation to the paradox of emancipation, discussed 
earlier, social analysis which places the ideas motivating critique beyond 
critique themselves, is philosophically untenable and at times even 
authoritarian. O’Regan (2006) – himself a CDA scholar – makes a related 
point in arguing that CDA in general is insufficiently reflexive. Indeed, not 
only does it hold onto a set of non-negotiables about the truths of society, but 
it also espouses a set of theoretical frameworks that see any truth as contingent 
and constructed through discourse. O’Regan (p. 233) talks of “a kind of 
metaphysical letting go with one hand, while grabbing on again with the 
other”, which results in incoherent theory: 
Let me be clear about this, I am not saying that I disagree with the 
agendas which Luke, McKenna, Rajagopalan, Fairclough and others 
put forward for doing critical work. On the contrary, I fully support 
them. My problem is how we are supposed to know on theoretical 
grounds that our perspective is the “correct” one. This is not at all 
clear, and Luke’s (2005) suggestion that it is simply a matter of 
“professing one’s reading position – out front and subject to scrutiny 
of all kinds” (p. 200) does not do the trick, although I wish it did. Self-
reflexivity works only if it includes the admission at the start that one’s 
situated perspective precludes the possibility of making judgements of 
truth, but I suspect that for some, and I do not necessarily mean Luke, 
this may be to concede too much (p. 233). 
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In other words, the critical agenda of the scholar must be regarded as just 
another discourse, something that stands as another version of reality rather 
than a transcendent one. Yet the fact that this political agenda precedes and is 
not available for modification from the material studied treats it as if it were 
transcendent. At times CDA wants to leap too fast to the macro level – what 
Fairclough (1995) calls the order of discourse – the level that is for many 
CDA scholars the determining level and hence where power ultimately lies. 
Finding Tools of Interpretation 
This problem is at heart one of interpretation. Discourse analysis needs 
analytical tools which allow it to interpret partly in terms of actors’ own 
categories and understandings and partly in terms of critical questions and 
sociological understandings of how people’s lives are shaped by social forces. 
Some critical discourse analysts do seek such balance in their analyses. 
Wodak, for example, runs focus groups alongside her textual analyses in her 
studies of the discourses of race and nationhood in Austria (e.g. Wodak, 
1996). But the logical outcome, in my view, of the arguments put forward by 
Simpson, O’Regan and me is that critical discourse analysis needs to move 
away from the strong use of textual tools which systemic functional linguistics 
opened up. Advances in discourse analysis point firmly in the direction of the 
inadequacy of theories of language which propose relatively fixed 
relationships between text and meaning. Language means different things in 
different contexts – indeed, discourse analysis’s claim to value as a 
methodology is its sensitivity to the lived quality of meaning. Moreover, as 
Benton notes, the analyst is not in a defensible position to decide a priori what 
that context is. Analysts who do so are at risk of being called paternalistic. 
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Hermes (2000) expresses an ethics, which I would call an ethics of 
understanding, which I argue underpins good discourse analysis:  
Feminist research, for me, is synonymous with showing respect. This 
is one of the reasons why I came to prefer the use of discourse analysis 
rather than more naturalistic and descriptive frameworks. After all, 
how are you to do justice to the complexities of another person’s life – 
morally, methodologically or theoretically?....[A] discourse 
perspective allowed me to neatly circumvent that old ghost of 
paternalism: of knowing better than my respondents what moved them 
and how popular forms had meaning for them (p. 356).  
There are problems with taking this position too far as well, of course, and 
media reception studies has been guilty of forgetting to critique the 
manipulative and consumerist aspects of popular culture at times in its 
celebration of people’s meaning-making. But what Hermes’ own work, a 
politically informed analysis of the gendering of magazine readers (e.g. 
Hermes, 1995) achieved, was a study of language use in which that political 
agenda was modified by what she heard. This was possible because she did 
not proceed with two separate theoretical systems, one to explain how 
meaning arises in text and one to explain the deployment of that meaning. 
I am not arguing for an abandonment of textual analysis which draws 
upon tools such as transitivity, presupposition, lexical analysis and the like. 
Critical discourse analysis has pulled together many useful tools. However, I 
am arguing for a reappraisal among some critical discourse scholars of some 
habits of critique. In particular, the object of study deserves respect, which is 
to say it deserves to be understood partly in its own terms. As Jaworski and 
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Coupland (1999, p. 37) note, discourse analysis is left with “tentativeness, 
more context relatedness, more contingency, more tolerance of ambiguity” 
once it scales back its ambitions in this way, but it gains in depth. In 
particular, it is more successful at maintaining a foot in the world of meaning 
as experienced by participants. 
There is in this argument a bias towards phenomenological 
approaches, which propose that social life can only be adequately understood 
as people’s unfolding experience of the meaning of things – the theory that 
shapes Foucault, Habermas, symbolic interactionists, ethnomethodologists, 
and others who are sceptical of Cartesian and structuralist categories. 
Whatever version of phenomenology is preferred, these are all distanced from 
rule and value-based sociology – what we can bundle under the word 
functionalism. Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that social science’s biggest mistake is 
to try to act like the natural sciences, because social life is not predictable in 
the same way according to universal rules. Social action can be described in 
terms of rules, but these will only ever be approximations because action is 
not experienced like that by people. Instead, the concert performer draws upon 
a tacit knowledge of how to play the instrument, the journalist just knows 
what a good story is and the nanoscientist has a feel for the rightness of a 
statement about how quarks move. The functional or structural analysis of the 
violinist is at risk of being limited to understanding the rules that a Suzuki 
violin student would be learning – the practice without the experience. If we 
are to critically investigate the discursive dimension of social life, then, we 
need to engage with the experience in some way. In this view, CDA’s already-
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made commitment to an overall interpretative framework, combined with the 
use of structuralist-functionalist linguistics, obstructs analysis.  
My position is that criticism and understanding are not distinct modes 
of analysis but moments of interpretation which imply the other. The 
hermeneutics which has emerged out of phenomenology (in particular 
Gadamer (1979) and Ricoeur & Ihde (2007)) proposes that rich understanding 
proceeds on the basis of prejudgements which the listener allows to be 
modified by what is heard. In Gadamer’s careful formulation, the task of the 
critic is to understand what the text truly means to her or him, seeking 
meaning without giving up the independence of her or his thinking. Neither 
the understanding of author of the text nor the critic-reader is imposed on the 
other. For a critical discourse analyst seeking evidence of structures of 
dominance, such an approach is anathema, for it undercuts the project. But it 
begins to answer O’Regan’s question, “how we are supposed to know…our 
perspective is the ‘correct’ one?” The correct answer, or the most correct 
interpretation for each particular critic, emerges as the outcome of a process of 
ethical engagement by the critic with the meaning-making of the subject. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse theory contributes here, 
particularly to salvaging some ability to make claims about the real and about 
inequalities of power in society. They propose that discursive power lies to a 
considerable extent in fixity, particularly in the ability to ascribe meanings that 
serve particular interests in key “nodal terms”. What hermeneutics does is 
make those meanings provisional and contested again. Mouffe in her later 
work argues that this is the task of critical analysis. She argues that politics 
can be understood as an irreconcilable struggle over meaning, in which the 
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multiple acts of interpretation by people in everyday life as well as in more 
overt “institutional” politics are sites of struggles for power. For Mouffe, the 
goal of critique is pluralism not consensus – in fact, she states that any 
consensus is a provisional hegemony, or stabilisation of power, which will 
exclude some perspectives ((Mouffe, 2000, p. 17). Society’s health, then, 
depends upon “the recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to 
suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order” (p. 16). Discourse analysts 
should not therefore look at texts as the marks of power but instead at the 
political contestation for meaning as a process of making power. The critical 
goal is to keep the process of disagreement open. 
This is not entirely satisfactory as an aim for critical discourse 
analysis, for it makes the critical project contingent and more tentative when 
powerful dominant discourses such as those of nationalism or economic 
progress stridently assert their truth; nonetheless, I think the direction is right. 
A more hermeneutically informed discourse analysis will be more tentative 
and contingent as it becomes better attuned to people’s lived experiences, and 
therefore will be less able to participate in grand periodising discourses about 
social structure. In order to do so, it needs to be augmented, as a number of 
scholars have suggested (e.g. Cameron, 2001, p. 140; Philo, 2007; Wodak, 
2001), by ethnographic, historical or participant research. It also needs to rely 
less on categorisations and taxonomies of language features, such as SFL 
grammar, which cannot be shown to emerge from the material being studied. 
But it need not be seen as less critical for its greater emphasis on 
understanding. Understanding and consensus need to be held separate. 
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Ultimately, what is at stake here is recuperating the analyst’s act of 
understanding as a critical tool. 
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i Indeed, discourse analysis has roots in the literal de-sanctification of knowledge by 
exegetes of the Bible who sought to understand holy writings as texts which could be 
built on through further texts, rather than as the final and unalterable word of God.  
ii Some of my students recently argued that “chairman” has no power among them to 
construct an expectation that the recipient would be male, on the grounds that they 
lived in a society where a gendered division of labour in chairing meetings made no 
sense.  
